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Capital Controls and Recovery from the Financial Crisis of the 1930s 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its stand against capital controls, 
recognizing that sudden capital surges can pose risk for some countries, and acknowledging that 
controls on capital inflows may be part of a toolkit that countries use to ward off financial crises 
(Ostry et al, 2010). This change in policy reverses the previous IMF position that favored free 
capital flows.1 Nevertheless, the use of capital controls as a policy tool, especially as a stopgap to 
ward off financial crises, remains controversial. For example, in 1998, Malaysia was castigated 
by policymakers and financial markets for imposing capital controls in response to the East 
Asian financial crisis. 
Since capital controls have been used in response to exchange-rate crises, understanding 
their macroeconomic effects relative to other policies is an important agenda for research. On the 
one hand, exchange controls bottle up capital inflows, thus potentially hindering a recovery 
driven by investment spending. On the other, their imposition could provide central banks with 
room for maneuver; in particular, central banks can maintain fixed exchange rates, but pursue 
expansionary monetary policy in the short run to stimulate output and return to long-run policy 
objectives. Research on the 1997-8 East Asian financial crisis has suggested that restrictions on 
the movement of capital may have produced a faster economic recovery in comparison to 
countries that relied on help from the IMF (Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002).  
Determining the relative benefits and costs of capital controls for economic recovery is 
ultimately an empirical question, and the Great Depression offers a potentially fertile testing 
ground for shedding light on this issue. Deflation spread globally after 1929, and as production 
and incomes fell, countries found it increasingly difficult to maintain pegged exchanged rates. 
By the mid-1930s, most had abandoned the gold-exchange standard and were seeking refuge in a 
variety of alternative exchange-rate arrangements, including capital controls. The abandonment 
of gold, however, was carried out in a haphazard manner, with some countries following 
England off gold in 1931 and others steadfastly staying on gold until after 1933 (Eichengreen, 
                                                
1 For example, in 1998, in its World Economic Outlook, the IMF was critical of Malaysia’s use of capital controls in 
response to the East Asian financial crisis (IMF, 1998, p.4). By 2011, deputy managing Director Nemat Shafik 
suggested that that Iceland keep its capital controls in place in response to the 2008-9 financial crisis (IMF, 2011).  
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1992, Kindleberger, 1986). Some chose to repeg at lower rates to particular currencies, such as 
the pound sterling, others floated their currencies, and many imposed exchange controls in order 
to shield their economies from the effects of short-term capital flows (“hot money”) and balance-
of-payments pressures.  
The Depression was the first financial crisis in the era of modern economic growth in 
which a large number of countries responded to balance-of-payments pressures by imposing 
restrictions on the movement of capital. Few, if any, financial crisis since the Depression have 
rivaled its severity and global impact, and few have witnessed so many countries responding by 
imposing capital controls, perhaps in part because many subsequent crises have been regional in 
nature (Glick and Rose, 1999). Previous research has found that de-linking from gold sped up 
recovery from the Great Depression (Choudhri and Kochin, 1980, Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985, 
Campa, 1990) and that imposing capital controls appears to have offered some relief from 
“golden fetters” (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998). Extant studies, however, have yet to analyze 
systematically how countries imposing exchange controls performed relative to countries that 
exited gold and floated their currencies after abandoning the gold standard or those that stayed 
on gold even longer (the so-called “gold bloc”).  
In order to fill these lacunae, we analyze the effects of capital controls on economic 
recovery in the 1930s by assembling a large, new monthly data set of macroeconomic variables 
and information on exchange rate and capital controls, spanning 1925-36, and containing of 
almost all the countries on the interwar gold standard. Our database classifies how and when 
countries abandoned the interwar gold standard as well as whether countries imposed exchange 
controls, enabling us to study counterfactuals and consider how the pace of recovery differed 
under alternative policy regimes.2  
We first show that the capital controls achieved their primary, short-run objective of 
stemming capital outflows. Gold cover ratios for exchange-control countries stabilized in the 
months following the imposition of capital controls. We then explore the impact of capital 
controls on macroeconomic performance, following their imposition. Our empirical analysis take 
                                                
2 While the modern economics literature uses the term capital controls, the writings of the 1930s uniformly use the 
term exchange controls as restrictions originated in restrictions of purchases and sales of foreign and domestic 
currency at market rates. However, interwar exchange controls quickly grew to include different measures 
restricting trade, travel, and the repatriation of capital gains. We therefore use both terms synonymously for the 
remainder of the paper.  
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advantage of the variation in timing of going off gold and heterogeneous policy responses in 
order to estimate the causal effects of exchange controls on economic recovery from the Great 
Depression. We employ time-shifted, difference-in-differences estimators to account for bias 
arising from the variation in timing of going off gold (i.e., when treatment began).  
Our results suggest that capital controls did not accelerate recovery from the Great 
Depression relative to countries that went off gold and floated. In examining the impact of 
capital controls on industrial production, exports, and prices, we only find statistically significant 
effects on industrial production. The estimated coefficient suggests that capital controls slightly 
reduced the rate of growth in industrial production relative to floaters. Countries imposing capital 
controls also appear to perform similar to the gold bloc countries with respect to output recovery 
and export growth, once the latter group of countries finally abandoned gold. Thus, while capital 
controls provided an immediate tool to combat capital flight, they appear have held no advantage 
over a free float, and likely even hindered recovery after they were imposed. 
We explore the implications of our results – why capital controls did not stimulate 
recovery. Time series regressions suggest that countries imposing capital controls did not 
actively pursue expansionary monetary policy after abandoning gold. Pairwise regressions with 
base countries show no statistically significant change in bank rate or discount rate behavior after 
countries imposed exchange controls, suggesting little deviation from established policy paths. 
Historical narratives and data on gold outflows corroborate our statistical findings: countries 
initially imposed capital controls to ward of exchange-rate or banking crises, but refrained from 
using their newly-acquired monetary policy autonomy to reflate their economies. Instead, capital 
controls expanded as instruments to regulate trade and to preserve foreign exchange for paying 
external debts and staving off default. 
The next section of the paper reviews existing research on exchange controls and relates 
it to the setting of this paper – the 1920s and 1930s. Section 3 employs a new panel level data set 
to quantify how capital controls influenced the paths of industrial production, exports, and prices 
relative to other policy regimes – countries that floated and countries that stayed on gold. Section 
4 analyzes central bank policy rates to determine the extent to which countries exploited the 
“policy trilemma” and took advantage of the ability to conduct autonomous monetary policy 
once capital controls were imposed. It then discusses why capital controls were maintained once 
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gold outflows subsided. Section 5 summarizes our findings on the use of capital controls in the 
1930s.  
 
2. Capital Controls and the Great Depression 
 
A. Costs and Benefits of Capital Controls 
Capital controls limit the movement of currency and foreign exchange across borders. 
They come in many forms and are put in place with a variety of goals in mind.3 They share the 
feature of centralizing all dealings of foreign exchange in the hands of some government 
authority. The first widespread use of them occurred during World War I. At the outset of war, 
belligerents tried to slow down the repatriation of capital so that foreign exchange could be used 
for purchasing strategic imports. These controls were also used as a means for raising revenue 
via higher inflation (delinking to gold and printing money) and as a tool for taxing wealth 
(Bakker, 1996). 
 In this paper, we study restrictions that were put in place as a reaction to balance-of-
payments pressures and, in particular, the threat of capital outflows.4 In currency crises, 
exchange controls are often employed as a response to anticipated or immediate danger of capital 
exports or repatriation of funds abroad. A League of Nations’ study (1938, p.25) concluded that 
capital controls were initially adopted in the late 1920s and early 1930s in response to a 
deterioration in balance of payments conditions and observed or anticipated flight of capital.5  
Some research has suggested capital controls have considerable utility in warding off 
financial crises. For example, Krugman (1998) argues that in the event of a crisis, temporary 
exchange controls can buy a country time to restructure its financial sector in an orderly fashion, 
lower interest rates, and put pro-growth policies in place.6 Others have pointed out that capital 
controls have a place in a world where free capital predominantly flows from poor to rich 
                                                
3 For example, controls might be used to limit outflows of capital for balance of payments reasons, to preserve 
domestic savings or to allocate capital to specific sectors of the economy.  
4 There is an equally large literature on the use of capital controls to ward off capital inflows, such as the use of them 
to limit real currency appreciations (Neely, 1999, and Johnston and Tamirisa, 1998). 
5 Ellis (1947, p. 878-9) suggests that during the 1930s the most common form of exchange control was enforcement 
of overvalued exchange rates as a device to avoid depreciation, which would have ensued because of the withdrawal 
or flight of capital from debtor countries. Exchange controls were thus used to defend a particular exchange rate and 
ward off capital flight. 
6 Klein (2012), however, finds “episodic” capital controls used recently to regulate inflow-fueled exchange rate 
appreciations and potentially destabilizing asset price booms are ineffective. 
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countries rather than the reverse and where unchecked capital flows can expose countries to 
excessive systemic risk (De Long, 2004). Blouin, Ghosal, and Muhan (2011) emphasize that 
arguments for capital controls are strongest when institutional state capacity is weak and the 
economic environment is uncertain, putting countries at risk for capital flight. 
On the other hand, critics point to evidence that the controls are ineffective: markets 
figure out ways to circumvent restrictions on the movement of capital, as was the case during 
Bretton Woods once restrictions on the current account were lifted. Critics also suggest that 
capital controls encourage corruption, hinder necessary policy adjustment in the time of a crisis, 
significantly raise trade costs and the cost of capital, and make it difficult to attract capital flows 
once the crisis period ebbs (e.g. Edwards, 1995, Wei and Zhang, 2007).  Moreover, even if 
implemented in response to balance-of-payments crises, they can become permanent policy 
features that distort markets (Edwards, 1999).  
Empirical research has attempted to quantify the relative benefits and costs of capital 
controls. For example, Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1993) find little evidence that, in 
general, capital controls reduce long-run growth. Edwards and Rigobon (2009) reexamine the 
effects of restrictions on capital inflows (as in Chile’s recent use of taxes on the movements of 
short-term portfolio investment), and suggest that these types of controls appear to reduce the 
vulnerability of the nominal exchange rate to external shocks.  
What has received less attention from researchers is the analysis of how capital controls 
imposed in response to financial crises affect recovery. This may be due to empirical hurdles that 
make credible identification difficult, such as having too few observed cases of countries 
imposing capital controls in response to a single crisis or the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity that arises from pooling observations across different crises. One recent attempt to 
overcome these challenges is Kaplan and Rodrik (2002), which uses difference-in-difference 
estimates to show that the one country that imposed capital controls in response to the 1997-8 
East Asian Financial Crisis, Malaysia, experienced stronger recovery relative to countries 
receiving IMF programs. 
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B. Exchange-Rate Responses to the Great Depression  
The global economic calamity of the 1930s ultimately led to the collapse of the interwar 
gold standard.7 Simmons (1997), Wandschneider (2008) and Wolf (2008) suggest that 
deflationary pressures, banking crises, gold reserves, and the prior experience of hyperinflation 
were important determinants in predicting when countries exited. As countries considered 
abandoning their pegged rates under the gold-exchange standard, they were confronted with the 
open economy macroeconomic policy trilemma (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2004). That 
is, whereas gold-standard countries had previously embraced fixed exchange rates and capital 
mobility in exchange for limited monetary policy sovereignty, abandoning the gold standard 
presented countries with new choices. They could: stay off gold permanently and float; devalue 
and re-peg at lower currency values: and/or put capital controls in place to give them some 
leverage over domestic monetary policy, perhaps with the hope of reflating their economies or 
injecting liquidity into weak or collapsing banking systems.  
Table 1 summarizes when countries suspended operation of the gold standard, when they 
depreciated or devalued, and when they imposed exchange controls. For our analysis, we follow 
other researchers (including the League of Nations), and broadly classify countries into three 
groups: (1) those that abandoned gold and imposed capital controls; (2) those that abandoned 
gold by floating their currencies; and (3) those that remained on gold after 1934. The last group 
includes countries commonly classified as the “gold bloc”: Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
Poland, and Switzerland. Italy is classified as an exchange control country for the current 
analysis since it imposed exchange controls in May of 1934 (Dimitrova et. al., 2007). In addition 
to the gold bloc, the “gold stalwarts” (i.e., group 3) includes Albania, Hong Kong, Lithuania and 
the Netherlands Indies, all of which abandoned gold in 1935 or later.  
The second group, the “floaters,” includes countries in the Sterling bloc and those that 
abandoned gold without imposing capital controls. Since a primary goal is to understand how 
capital controls affected recovery from the Depression, we categorize Finland and the United 
States as floaters, despite both countries brief experience with exchange controls during this 
period. For Finland, the exchange control period was only three months – October to December 
1931 – and it is seen as ineffective in stemming capital flight (Letho-Sinisalo, 1992). Similarly, 
                                                
7 The interwar gold standard was often known as the gold-exchange standard because countries supplemented gold 
reserves with the foreign currency of other countries pegged to gold. 
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exchange controls in the US are generally not considered effective as can be seen in the active 
forward market in US dollar. Since Portugal’s capital controls were nominally in place since 
1922, and since they were not used to manage a balance-of-payments crisis, we classify this 
country as a floater.  
The group of exchange control countries comprises the largest group in our sample. It 
largely consists of Central and Eastern European countries, Latin American countries, Japan, and 
Iran. Bulgaria heavily relied on exchange controls to align itself with Germany after 1931, so we 
classify it as an exchange control country. In most countries, exchange controls took the form of 
administrative controls, with the government centralizing exchange dealings, setting official 
exchange rates, and hindering the transfer of capital abroad by private citizens to stop capital 
flight and curb speculation. Governments also took control of export proceeds and privately held 
foreign assets (Ellis, 1941).  
 
C. Why Did Some Countries Initially Impose Capital Controls? 
Nurkse (1944) corroborated the findings of the 1938 League of Nations study, suggesting 
that the principal reason most countries imposed capital controls in the 1930s was to curb the 
outflow of capital.8 Ellis (1941) also states that countries in this period explicitly used exchange 
controls to protect against capital flight and to defend parities that had become overvalued based 
on purchasing power parity values or international price comparisons.9 Many European countries 
opted for capital controls when confronted with banking crises in the spring and summer of 
1931, falling foreign exchange reserves, and capital flight. Some countries appear to have been 
concerned that floating rates, without capital controls, would ignite hyperinflations similar to 
those seen in Continental Europe in the early 1920s. Germany is often cited as the most 
prominent example of a country that imposed extensive capital controls, creating a complex 
system of bilateral trade clearing agreements in the late 1930s after their imposition (Child, 
1978; Neal, 1979).10 German capital controls were initially imposed to curb capital outflows and 
                                                
8 Exceptions may have been Hungary, Greece, and Bulgaria, which appear to have implemented capital controls in 
1931 to acquire foreign exchange for debt servicing (Nurkse, 1944) 
9 Quotas and restrictions on imports, used by France and other gold bloc countries, were an alternative means for 
maintaining overvalued parities (Nurkse, 1944). 
10 The German bilateral clearing agreements, set up by Hjalmar Schacht in 1934, relied on a system of managed 
accounts and fixed exchange rates to circumvent the need for gold and foreign assets. At its height, they expanded to 
25 countries and covered about half of all German foreign trade (Neal, 1979). 
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maintained in order to keep the official foreign exchange rates for the Reichsmark at the old 
parity; thereafter, an extensive trade clearing system was created to offset the distortionary price 
and trade effects of the capital controls. The clearing system was then utilized by the Nazi 
government in order to secure critical imports in the absence of foreign currency (US Tariff 
Commission, 1942). And when countries such as Germany and Hungary imposed exchange 
controls, some nearby trading partners felt pressure to follow suit (Ellis 1941).  
 Others imposed capital controls at the time of abandoning gold or shortly thereafter, 
perhaps fearing what a completely unfettered float might do to their currency values or perhaps 
as an attempt to gain leverage over domestic monetary policy. Primary-product exporting 
countries in South and Central America imposed controls in response to balance-of-payment 
pressures and potential sovereign debt defaults (Bratter, 1939). “Gold bloc” countries fought 
against the tide and tried to remain on the gold standard well into the 1930s. In response, they 
resorted to the twin approach of exchange controls and trade protection (Eichengreen and Irwin, 
2010).  
 To assess whether capital controls had an effect on halting capital flight, we computed 
cover ratios for countries imposing capital controls. The cover ratio for each country is 
calculated as the ratio of central bank gold reserves and foreign currency assets to its domestic 
liabilities (defined as notes in circulation). Data are from the Statistisches Handbuch der 
Weltwirtschaft (1934, 1936/7). Figure 1 then centers each country’s data based on the month on 
which it imposed exchange controls. As the figure shows, cover ratios declined dramatically in 
the 15 months prior to imposing controls, falling from around 70 percent to below 50 percent. In 
the months following the imposition of capital controls, the ratio then stabilizes and recovers 
somewhat.   
 
3. Analyzing how Capital Controls Influenced Recovery from the Great Depression 
 
A. Cross-Sectional Evidence 
At the time of their imposition, the League of Nations viewed the widespread use of 
capital controls as troubling. While recognizing that they halted capital outflows, the League 
became concerned that the long-term costs of maintaining them would outweigh their short-run 
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benefits, suggesting that they would raise domestic prices and reduce exports (League of 
Nations, 1938). Foreman-Peck (1983) later estimated that, as of 1934, the currencies of exchange 
control countries were overvalued by as much as 60% relative to the pound and the dollar. Ellis 
(1939) suggests that exchange controls discouraged foreign investment by hindering capital 
repayments. He also claims that exchange control countries had lower output and trade than 
countries with depreciated currencies, outcomes we empirically test in our paper. On the other 
hand, Aldcroft and Oliver (1998) suggest that many exchange control countries expanded their 
trade through clearing agreements and were able to obtain higher prices for their exports in the 
clearing markets than in the world market (in effect, diverting trade).  
Previous research has established that going off gold was linked to faster economic 
recovery (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985 and Campa, 1990), but the focus of these studies was 
largely on identifying the pre- and post-effects of leaving the gold-exchange standard. 
Comparatively less attention has been paid to the precise way in which countries abandoned their 
pegs. A few studies use cross-sectional data to suggest that countries, which chose to remain on 
the gold standard, had lower rates of growth in industrial production between 1929-35, but that 
this slow growth was mitigated by the use of exchange controls (Eichengreen, 1992 and Obstfeld 
and Taylor, 1998). These same studies suggest that countries preserving fixed exchange rates 
were exposed to greater deflation, but find that deflation was less if they implemented exchange 
controls; however, they do not try to account for differences in the timing of the implementation 
of capital controls and how this might influence recovery. 
We begin our analysis of the effects on recovery from the Depression by discussing our 
data and presenting some summary evidence on macroeconomic performance once countries 
abandoned gold. To do so, we collected monthly data from 1925-36 on industrial production, 
wholesale prices, and exports for a sample of 50 countries from the League of Nations (1937; 
1938) and the Statistical Handbook of the World Economy (Statistisches Handbuch der 
Weltwirtschaft). Our database improves on existing interwar datasets by expanding coverage for 
the number of countries (Latin America and Asia, plus Europe), the number of years (1925 to 
1936), and the frequency of data (monthly versus annual). Our sample includes all the major 
economies on the interwar gold standard as well as almost all other countries that had adopted 
gold during this period.  
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Figures 2-4 plot the change in the parity between 1929 and 1936 against industrial 
production, exports, and wholesale prices. The y-axis values are measured relative to 1929 
values, with 1929 indexed at 100. As in Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) and Campa (1990), we 
find that countries with large post-1929 devaluations experienced stronger growth in all three 
measures, suggesting a reversal in the trends of the deflation and declining output and exports 
that had set in during the Great Depression. As shown in Table 1, countries’ policy responses to 
the Great Depression differed. We thus examine the scatter plots for the three sub-groups: 
exchange control countries, “floaters,” and “gold stalwarts” (those that remained on gold past 
1934). Figures 5-7 show that the salutary effects documented in the first set of plots were 
strongest for the floaters. The scatter diagrams suggest that after abandoning gold (and up 
through 1936), exchange control countries experienced only a slight recovery in industrial 
production, wholesale prices, and exports.  
To shed more light on the effects on the longer-run effects of capital controls, we present 
results from cross sectional regressions. In particular, we regress one of our macroeconomic 
outcome variables (industrial production, wholesale prices, or exports) on a constant, a dummy 
variable for exchange controls, a dummy variable for countries that remained on gold past 1934, 
and a normally distributed error term. Our sample period ends in 1936, which relative to 
previous studies, allows us to include more gold bloc countries in our analysis of post-gold 
standard period; however, the coding of policy regime is nearly equivalent to Obstfeld and 
Taylor (1998). Hence, we are able to replicate their analysis when restricting the sample period 
to end in 1935.  
Columns 1-3 of Table 2 define the dependent variable as the total percentage change 
between 1929 and 1935 whereas columns 4-6 define it as the total percentage change between 
1929 and 1936. For gold stalwarts, our results are similar to those reported in Obstfeld and 
Taylor (1998). As columns 1-3 show, countries that remained on the gold standard after 1934 
experienced an 18 percent cumulative drop in industrial production and a 28 percent fall in 
prices, reflecting the deflationary pressures of staying on the gold standard in the 1930s. We also 
document an almost 40% drop in exports in 1935 compared to 1929. The results are similar 
when we the sample period is extended to 1936 (columns 4-6). By contrast, our results for 
exchange control countries differ from earlier studies that reported positive effects of exchange 
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controls on output and wholesale prices reported in Obstfeld and Taylor (1998). Between 1929-
1935, we can identify no statistically significant effect of exchange controls on output, wholesale 
prices, or export performance. If we instead use 1936 as last year of the sample period, exchange 
controls appear to moderate the decline in exports; however, we find no statistically significant 
difference, relative to floaters, for aggregate changes in industrial production and wholesale 
prices.  
 
B. Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
 As found in previous studies, summary statistics confirm that abandoning gold 
accelerated economic recovery in the 1930s. In contrast, however, simple cross-sectional 
regressions using our higher frequency and larger sample data set show somewhat different 
effects for exchange control countries. To explore these results further and develop causal 
estimates, we exploit the panel nature of our data (i.e., monthly data on a large sample of 
countries) to construct difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of exchange controls on 
several macroeconomic outcome variables.  
Our identification strategy takes advantage of the variation in the timing of gold standard 
abandonment and restrictions in the movement of capital to identify an average treatment effect 
on the treated. Again, Table 1 displays the time-series variation in policy changes across 
countries. If such differences in timing are not accounted for, it can produce biased estimates of 
our “treatment” variable. To illustrate this point, consider the more recent 1997-98 East Asian 
financial crisis. Malaysia was still experiencing severe economic difficulties through the summer 
of 1998, at a time when neighboring countries were already recovering from the 1997 Asian 
crisis. Malaysia’s capital controls, however, came into place later than South Korea or Thailand’s 
IMF assistance. Once this difference in timing of the treatment is accounted for, Malaysia 
appears to have had a faster recovery with capital controls in comparison to those that received 
IMF assistance packages (Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002). Similarly for our interwar sample, a bias in 
the treatment effect would occur if one does not account for the variation in timing of when 
countries leave the gold standard or impose exchange controls. For example, gold stalwart 
countries are often found to have slow recoveries despite the fact that they did recover when they 
finally left gold.  
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To gain some insight into how differences in implementation might matter, we first plot 
the average monthly growth rates of industrial production, prices, and exports based on the 
policy choice after abandoning gold. Figures 8-10 show the before and after effects of leaving 
gold on these three macroeconomic outcome variables when we explicitly control for the month 
when each country departed gold. It is important to note that the results are not to be confused 
with the cross section results of Table 2. The growth effects documented here solely measure the 
recovery of countries once they have left the gold standard or imposed exchange controls. The 
graphs still confirm that growth rates increased, deflation ended, and exports rose as countries 
abandoned the gold standard; however, rates differ significantly by group. Figure 8 shows that 
growth increased for all three groups when countries abandoned the gold standard or imposed 
exchange controls, and this effect appears largest for the gold stalwarts. Before leaving gold, 
floaters showed the largest decline in growth rates. All three groups showed deflation while on 
gold (compare to Figure 9), but again the effect was largest for the floaters. Gold stalwarts 
exhibit the strongest upward trend in prices after going off gold. Exchange control countries, in 
contrast, perform similar to floaters. With respect to exports, growth declines by about 0.5 
percentage points for all country groups while on the gold standard. Gold stalwarts exhibit the 
fastest recovery in exports after finally leaving gold. Exchange control countries again recover 
slightly slower than floaters.  
To explicitly account for variation in the timing of gold standard abandonment and policy 
choice, we estimate a time-shifting, difference-in-differences model of the following form:  
 
(1) yit = αit + βEventit + γEventit*XControlsi + σEventit*Goldi + Ci +Montht +µit, 
 
where yit is one of our three measures of macroeconomic performance (growth in industrial 
production, the wholesale inflation rate, or export growth). Eventit is a time-varying dummy 
variable that indicates the time off gold for each country. It equals one in all the months 
following a country’s decision to devalue and/or officially suspend the gold standard (thereby 
leaving gold de jure or de facto) or impose exchange controls. Xcontrolsi is a dummy variable for 
exchange controls as defined in Table 1a. Goldi is a dummy variable for the stalwarts: countries 
that remained on gold through the end of 1934 as defined in Table 1c. Ci are country fixed 
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effects, which absorb the time-invariant dummies for Goldi and Xcontrolsi. Montht are time fixed 
effects, and 
€ 
ui,t is a white-noise error term. We estimate models where the omitted category is 
the floaters – countries that leave the gold standard before the end of 1934 and do not impose 
exchange controls thereafter. Our counterfactual estimates thus focus on the effects for two 
treatment groups, exchange control countries and the stalwarts, relative to floaters. In this 
specification, β describes the percentage point change (technically, log points) of the effect of 
leaving the gold standard for the omitted category.  γ and σ respectively estimate the effect of 
going off gold for the exchange control countries and the gold stalwarts relative to the omitted 
group.  
Table 3 presents difference-in-differences regression estimates as specified in equation 
(1). Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are clustered at the country level. For floaters, 
going off gold raises the growth rate in industrial production by 1.1%, increases monthly 
wholesale inflation by 0.7% and stimulates export growth by 1.8%, which is consistent with 
Figures 8-10.  Exchange control countries see a 0.7% smaller boost in industrial production 
growth in comparison to floaters, but no statistically significant different effect with respect to 
inflation and exports. Gold stalwarts show a 1.3% significant increase in the monthly wholesale 
inflation relative to floaters when they finally leave gold, but no statistically significant effect 
with respect to industrial production or exports.  
Alternative specifications, taking into account the various sizes of countries’ devaluations 
as well as macroeconomic controls such as the discount rate yielded similar results, confirming 
the finding of no additional output effects from exchange controls. Overall, these results confirm 
the findings of the cross-section analysis – that exchange control countries did not outperform 
floaters and do not appear different from the gold stalwarts.11 
 
C. Endogeneity of Exchange Controls 
To account for the possibility that countries that imposed exchange controls were non-
randomly selected into the treatment group, we also estimated instrumental variables 
regressions.12 Since decisions about exchange-rate regime choices in the late nineteenth and 
                                                
11 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
12 To assuage concerns about endogeneity, Bernanke (1995) argues that the endogenity bias of leaving gold points in 
the wring direction, since countries with weaker economic performance would be mode inclined to leave. Moreover, 
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early twentieth centuries were dominated by concerns about price stability, we use the change in 
a country’s price level between 1913-1922 as our instrumental variable. In other words, a 
country’s decision about whether to use the gold standard in its purest form may be related to its 
past experience with inflation. Countries that experienced hyperinflation may have been 
especially reluctant to abandon the gold standard in the 1930s. Changes in prices during the 
period 1913-22 are largely associated with wartime disruptions to markets and the end of 
wartime price controls and therefore represent a plausibly exogenous shock that tempered later 
decisions about exchange rates. Moreover, price dynamics under the reconstituted interwar gold 
standard were fundamentally different from the price movements in the floating period before 
1922: there is no direct effect from the 1913-22 price changes on industrial production, 
wholesale prices, and exports under the gold standard regime. Our instrument has a t statistic of 
4.0 in the first stage regression.13 Table 4 shows that our main findings are not measurably 
affected when we address the issue of endogeneity. Allowing for non-random selection amplifies 
the negative effects of exchange controls relative to floaters for both exports and wholesale 
prices. That is, prices and exports grow more slowly after the change in policy relative to 
countries that simply abandoned gold and floated. For industrial production, we see no measured 
difference. Even if our instrument is imperfect, it does little harm to the main thrust of our 
findings since the direction of bias is likely positive and accounting for endogeneity would only 
lead to further attenuation of any reported effects. In conclusion, using different specifications 
and instrumenting for selection bias, we find that, relative to stalwarts and floaters, capital 
controls had no positive effect on economic recovery from the financial crisis of the 1930s. 
 
4. Why Were Capital Controls Ineffective at Boosting Recovery? 
 
A. Policy Rate Interdependence 
Our difference-in-difference regression estimates suggest that, relative to floaters, 
countries imposing exchange controls exhibit no statistically significant difference in exports or 
wholesale prices and show a somewhat smaller recovery in industrial production. These findings 
                                                                                                                                                       
Eichengreen (1992) carefully documents the political factors which surrounded each country’s decision to leave 
gold.  
13 Country samples are somewhat smaller in the IV regressions due to missing data of incomplete data on the change 
in prices for the period 1913-22. 
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are consistent with Ellis’ (1939) untested claim that capital controls discouraged foreign 
investment and that capital control countries showed slower output growth. In the framework of 
the international macroeconomics policy trilemma, this result might seem surprising since 
countries imposing capital controls had policy flexibility after abandoning gold, and therefore 
should have performed at least as well as the floaters. For example, in the presence of capital 
controls, they could now conduct monetary policy with the aim of injecting liquidity into 
banking systems, reflating prices, or stimulating output. Although he does not formally test it, in 
his study of the interwar gold standard Nurkse (1944, p.169), suggests countries may have kept 
exchange controls in place to “permit the adoption of monetary expansion at home or to at least 
avert the need for further deflation.” 
To understand why we fail to see faster macroeconomic recovery, we analyze the extent 
to which exchange-control countries availed themselves to autonomous monetary policymaking 
after they change their policies by examining interest rate interdependence with key gold 
standard countries. We examine the monthly movements of bank rates or discount rates before 
and after capital controls were put in place since this was the policy variable that most central 
banks targeted during our sample period. We run bivariate regressions, comparing changes in 
each capital control country’s discount rate (i.e., policy variable) to changes in a base country’s 
discount rate (meant to represent a benchmark rate that policymakers in other countries would 
have followed in order to maintain gold convertibility).  
We focus on the behavior of changes in discount rates or bank rates since results from 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit roots or near unit 
roots in many of the bank rate series.14 For all countries imposing capital controls for which we 
have data, we regress (in first differences) the discount rate for the country with capital controls 
on a constant term, the discount rate in a base country, a dummy variable for when capital 
controls are imposed, and a white-noise error term. We test whether the dummy variable 
indicating the presence of capital controls is statistically significant different from zero. The base 
policy rate in the regression represents either the United States or France, two countries which 
were at the core of the interwar gold standard and which had accumulated large amounts of gold 
prior to 1929.  
                                                
14 Using ADF tests on the discount rates, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in levels for all countries 
except for Austria and Hungary. We reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all countries  in first differences. 
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Table 5 displays regression results. The dummy variable for capital controls is never 
statistically significant different from zero, suggesting no discernable difference in the behavior 
of interest rate deviations from the base country after exchange controls were implemented.15As 
a robustness check, we expanded the set of base countries to include England and Germany to 
see if there is any evidence that interest-rate policies were asymmetric. That is, while the U.S. 
and France were linchpins of the interwar gold standard, for some countries they were not the 
most important trading partner, and since exchange controls can affect both the financial account 
and the current account, it may be that some countries monetary policies reflected their principal 
trading partners. Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) as well as Ritschl and Wolf (2003) document the 
breakup of the interwar gold standard into trade and currency blocs after its collapse. Many 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, had close trade ties to Germany, and after 
exchange controls were imposed, may have pursued monetary policy differently with respect to 
Germany in comparison to France or the United States. One of the four base countries shown in 
Table 5 constitutes the principal trading partner for nearly every country in our sample. When the 
coefficients on the base country are examined, nearby countries such as Austria, Greece, and 
Hungary seem to track Germany’s monetary policy closely; however, columns 1 and 3 of the 
table show no evidence of a shift in monetary policy towards either England or France once 
capital controls are in place. Based on these monetary policy regressions, we conclude that 
notably different monetary policies were not followed after exchange controls were put in place. 
 
B. Further Evidence on Monetary Policy 
Interest rate regressions suggest little change in behavior of discount rates after capital 
controls were imposed. As has been widely noted by economic historians, the financial crisis of 
the 1930s manifested itself as twin crises in many countries (Grossman, 1994; Eichengreen, 
1992; Grossman and Meissner, 2010). With capital controls in place, however, these countries 
could now conduct monetary policy with the aim of injecting liquidity into banking systems. Did 
they do so? Figure 11 presents additional evidence on this question by plotting the average 
money growth rates (M0) for the three groups in our sample, before and after countries leave 
gold. Consistent with the policy rate regressions, we see a slower growth in money for capital 
                                                
15 Standard errors are Newey-West corrected for serial correlation. 
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control countries after their departure from gold, suggesting that, even if they had found freedom 
to inject liquidity, they did not take full advantage of it.16   
 As a final test of the conduct of monetary policy after the imposition of capital controls, 
we looked at whether covered interest parity (CIP) held. In particular, we examined the implied 
profit opportunities that existed if CIP conditions were not met. Violations of CIP indicate 
arbitrage opportunities, or in our case, that capital controls could have potentially been used to 
maintain an interest rate different from the global interest rate. Evidence of such differences 
could suggest that monetary policy was employed to stimulate the domestic economy. 
Unfortunately, data on forward exchange for our sample period exist for just seven countries, 
only two of which (Italy and Germany) imposed capital controls and kept them in place for more 
than a year; hence, the conclusions this exercise are more limited.17 However, based on this 
limited sample, we find little evidence from either the time series plots or structural break tests 
that the behavior of implied profits from interest rate arbitrage for capital control countries were 
any larger or persisted longer in comparison to, for example, other gold bloc countries that did 
not impose them and instead devalued.18 
 
C. Why did Countries Maintain Capital Controls? 
As noted, primary sources from the interwar period suggests that policymakers initially 
imposed capital controls to stop capital flight; however, once the outflows abated, why did 
countries keep the controls in place? Indeed, many policymakers at the time were opposed to 
their maintenance. For example, the Bank for International Settlements which, even in its infancy 
attempted to coordinate central bank activity, thought the maintenance of capital controls stood 
in the way of reconstituting the gold standard; the BIS thus viewed exchange controls as partly 
responsible for delaying recovery from the Depression (BIS, Annual Report, 1935, 1936). 
One reason we examine the somewhat longer-term effects of capital controls is that they 
may have afforded additional room for maneuver given the constraints of the policy trilemma. 
Our econometric evidence (albeit ex post) suggests capital controls had little effect on economic 
                                                
16 To be clear, similar Figures 8-10, the “off gold” period for the stalwart countries only refers to the months in 1935 
and 1936, in which these countries had also abandoned the gold standard.  
17 The five others are Belgium, Holland, France, Switzerland, and the U.S. Data are forward exchange are from 
Einzig (1934) and interest rate data from Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2004). 
18 Results are available upon request. 
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recovery in the 1930s relative to other policy options. Further, our examination of short-term 
interest rates seems to indicate that central banks did not substantially deviate from gold-standard 
policy paths in order to reflate their economies and expand output. 
The historical record points to several other reasons why exchange controls may have 
been maintained. First, although the initial focus was on capital controls and pressure on the 
financial/capital account, their persistence can likely be attributed to concerns over the current 
account (likely reflecting exchange rates that were still managed and overvalued). As global 
trade collapsed and export earnings fell (due to falling aggregate demand, rising trade barriers, 
and falling prices), the demand for foreign exchange grew. One way to ensure that foreign 
exchange needs of governments could be met was to restrict imports via quotas, import 
restrictions, and import substitution policies (Fishlow 1972, Thorp, 1984). Another way to limit 
imports, however, was exchange controls. As Eichengreen and Irwin (2010, pp.879) emphasize, 
“If the exchange controls were comprehensive and effective, they could be administered in a 
manner that left no need for additional measures such as tariffs or quotas. Import licensing and 
government allocation of foreign exchange meant that officials could determine the total amount 
of spending on imports and the allocation of that spending across different goods and country 
suppliers. Therefore, a country imposing exchange controls might not have to resort to higher 
tariffs and quotas because it already had the ability to limit imports through administrative 
action.” 
As the decade progressed, it became increasingly clear that exchange controls were 
working in conjunction with tariffs and quotas to restrict imports. Imports were often forbidden 
without an exchange permit guaranteeing the distribution of foreign currency to pay for them. 
“Traders were at liberty to import…but when it came to paying for the goods they often found 
their exchange applications were met only in part or only after a long delay. This was the origin 
of the ‘blocked’ commercial balances which many countries, whether or not they practiced 
exchange control themselves, accumulated in their dealings with exchange-control countries, and 
these blocked claims led to the use of clearing, funding or other arrangements designed to 
liquidate them. As a result, there was a marked tendency for exchange and trade controls to be 
more closely integrated” (Nurkse, 1944, p.175).  
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In addition, large external debt positions created ongoing demand for foreign exchange. 
The American stock market boom, however, began to seriously drain liquidity from borrowing 
regions toward the end of the 1920s.19 By 1929, after the Federal Reserve increased short-term 
rates, investors found domestic bonds increasingly attractive. U.S. net short-term and long-term 
lending turned negative (Eichengreen and Portes, 1990), and net external debtors (including the 
British Colonies, Eastern and Central Europe, and Latin America) found themselves scrambling 
to maintain sufficient foreign exchange to pay the interest on their loans abroad. Global 
commodity prices collapsed at around the same time (Lewis, 1949), compounding the debt 
servicing problem for many of these primary-product producers and triggering a compression of 
imports and current expenditures. As the global economic situation deteriorated in the early 
1930s, exchange controls became a means for acquiring the currency to service debt. 
Government officials in Hungary, Greece, and Bulgaria imposed capital controls in 1931 to fend 
off debt default, and Latin American countries kept capital controls in place after outflows 
subsided in a futile attempt to avoid defaulting on external debt.  
Countries also turned to clearing arrangements to earmark export earnings for debt 
service. For example, Western European creditor countries that ran bilateral trade surpluses with 
Germany could use the proceeds out of exports to service German loans via compulsory clearing 
arrangements (Nurkse, 1944).20 Similarly, England used the stick of the Ottowa Agreements of 
1932 (which gave preference to Commonwealth and Empire exports) and the carrot of the 1933 
Roca-Runciman Treaty (granting Argentina favored access to these same markets) to secure 
Argentine payments on its British held foreign debt (Eichengreen and Portes, 1990).  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The global economic crisis of the 1930s left an indelible mark on the evolution of the 
world economy. One particularly lasting remnant was restrictions on the movement of capital or 
“hot money.” (It took until the 1980s for capital flows to regain their importance in the global 
                                                
19 The U.S. and U.K. accounted for roughly two-thirds of all gross foreign investment during the interwar period, 
with much of the U.K. investment channeled to the colonies or dominions (Eichengreen and Portes, 1986). 
20 More than a quarter of Europe’s gross foreign obligations (excluding war debts and reparations) was German 
external debt. It had continued to borrow heavily between the Dawes Loan and when it imposed capital controls in 
1931. (Eichengreen and Portes, 1986) 
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economy.) In this paper, we describe how capital controls first emerged in the 1930s as a 
response to capital flight during a global financial crisis. They appear to have succeeded in 
slowing down capital flight. We then document how the controls then persisted, even after gold 
cover ratios stabilized. Because of policy persistence, we are able to examine whether capital 
controls affected economic recovery from a financial crisis. Results from time-shifted, 
difference-in-differences regressions suggest that countries that used capital controls fared worse 
than floaters and no better than the gold-standard stalwarts – those gold bloc countries that 
steadfastly maintained gold into the mid-1930s. Capital controls do not appear to have stimulated 
recovery from the Great Depression. 
Capital controls gave central banks additional scope to pursue autonomous monetary 
policy while maintaining fixed exchange rates. Our results, however, suggest that countries that 
had imposed them did not fully take advantage of their policy freedom. Interest-rate behavior 
relative to key gold standard countries shows no sizable change after capital controls are 
implemented and money supplies do not show faster growth relative to other countries that left 
gold. These findings are consistent with a large body of research suggests that monetary policies 
were far too tight in the early 1930s (Eichengreen, 1992; Temin, Friedman and Schwartz, 1962; 
Temin, 1989) – promoting deflation and, in some cases, contributing to the collapse of banking 
systems. In contrast, countries that moved to floating rates pursued expansionary monetary 
policies and appear to have halted further deflation and declining incomes and production.  
Capital controls, though potentially useful (especially for small, open economies) for 
macroeconomic recovery, appear not have been successfully utilized as tools for rescuing 
banking systems, stimulating domestic output, or for raising prices. Rather they appear to have 
been maintained as a means for restricting trade (working alongside or in lieu of restrictions on 
imports) and repayment of foreign debts. While our analysis suggests capital controls provided 
little macroeconomic benefit relative to other policies that were implemented in the 1930s, it 
would be difficult to conclude that they would have no ameliorative effects in other crises if 
employed with that purpose in mind. On the other hand, the experience of the 1930s suggests 
capital controls are often implemented with very short-run objectives in mind – to prevent capital 
flight – and macroeconomic objectives can end up sharing the stage with other goals of 
policymakers.
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Table 1: Classifications of Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Panel A:  Exchange control countries 
 
Country Official 
Suspension 
Exchange 
Control 
Devaluation 
or 
depreciation 
Argentina 12/29 10/31 11/29 
Austria 4/33 10/31 9/31; 4/34 
Bolivia 9/31 10/31 3/30 
Brazil  5/31 12/29 
Bulgaria  1918  
Chile 4/32 7/31 4/32 
China  9/34  
Colombia 9/31 9/31 1/32 
Costa Rica  1/32  
Cuba** 11/33 6/34-7/34 4/33 
Czechoslovakia  10/31 2/34; 10/36 
Denmark 9/31 11/31 9/31 
Ecuador 2/32 5/32-10/35; 
7/36  
6/32 
El Salvador** 10/31 8/33-10/33 10/31 
Estonia 6/33 11/31 6/33 
Germany  7/31  
Greece 4/32 9/31 4/32 
Hungary  7/31  
Iran  2/30-5/33; 
3/36 
 
Italy  5/34 3/34; 10/36 
Japan 12/31 7/32 12/31 
Latvia 9/36 10/31 9/36 
Nicaragua** 11/31 11/31 1/32 
Romania  5/32 7/35 
Turkey  2/30  
Uruguay 7/29 9/31 4/29 
Venezuela  12/36 9/30 
Yugoslavia  10/31 7/32 
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Table 1: Classifications of Exchange Rate Regimes (continued) 
 
Panel B: Free Currency – Floaters 
Country Official 
Suspension 
Exchange 
Control 
Devaluation 
or 
depreciation 
Australia 12/29  3/30 
Canada 10/31  9/31 
Egypt 9/31   
Finland 10/31 10/31-12/31 10/31 
Guatemala**   4/33 
India 9/31  9/31 
Iraq**    
Irish Free State 9/31  9/31 
Mexico 7/31  8/31 
New Zealand 9/31  4/30 
Norway 9/31  9/31 
Peru 5/32  5/32 
Philippines**   4/33 
Portugal 12/31 10/22 10/31 
South Africa 12/32  1/33 
Sweden 9/31  9/31 
UK 9/31  9/31 
US 4/33 3/33-11/34 4/33 
 
 
 
Panel C: Countries on Gold after 1934 
Country Official 
Suspension 
Exchange 
Control 
Devaluation 
or 
depreciation 
Albania    
Belgium 3/35 3/35-4/35 3/35 
France   9/36 
Hong-Kong**  11/35  
Lithuania  10/35  
Netherlands 9/36  9/36 
Netherlands 
Indies 
9/36  9/36 
Poland  4/36  
Switzerland   9/36 
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Table 1: Classifications of Exchange Rate Regimes (continued) 
 
Panel D: Others 
 
Country 
Official 
Suspension 
Exchange 
Control 
Devaluation 
or 
depreciation 
Spain*  5/31  
USSR*   4/36 
 
Source: League of Nations (1937), BIS (1936). Data on clearing agreements only extends to 
1935. 
*USSR and Spain were dropped from the econometric analysis since they were not on the gold 
standard prior to floating or imposing exchange controls.  
** These countries have exchange rate data, but no corresponding monthly observations for 
industrial production, wholesale prices, and exports. Hence, they are excluded from the 
econometric analysis.  
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Table 2: The Effects of Capital Controls on Prices, Exports and Production 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level and ** 
indicates significance at 5% level.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effects of Capital Controls on Prices, 
Exports, and Production 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Constant Off Gold Interaction 
Xcontrol 
Interaction 
Gold 
R2  Observations 
Monthly 
Growth in 
Industrial 
Production 
0.01508 
(0.0132) 
0.011227** 
(0.0045) 
-0.006803* 
(0.0030) 
0.001501 
(0.0060) 
0.14 3343  
(25 countries) 
Monthly 
Wholesale 
Inflation 
-0.0054 
(0.0039) 
0.007299** 
(0.0019) 
-0.001731 
(0.0020) 
0.01283* 
(0.0066) 
0.20 3778  
(37 countries) 
Monthly 
Growth in 
Exports 
0.06436 
(0.0353) 
0.01778** 
(0.0051) 
-0.00517 
(0.0040) 
0.00299 
(0.0104) 
0.16 5124  
(36 countries) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. * 
indicates significance at the 10% level and ** indicates significance at the 5% level. All 
equations include time and country fixed effects.  
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Table 4. IV Estimates of the Effects of Capital Controls 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Off Gold Interaction 
Xcontrol 
Interaction 
Gold 
Observations 
Monthly 
Growth in 
Industrial 
Production 
0.0037 
(0.005) 
0.0035 
(0.0066) 
0.01776 
(0.0110) 
3057  
(23 countries) 
Monthly 
Wholesale 
Inflation 
0.0111*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0048** 
(0.0023) 
0.0268** 
(0.0111) 
3778  
(37 countries) 
Monthly 
Growth in 
Exports 
0.0219*** 
(0.0062) 
-0.0196*** 
(0.0063) 
0.03414**  
(0.01652) 
4123  
(29 countries) 
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Table 5:  Explaining the Movement of Discount Rates for Capital Control Countries, 1925-
1936 
 
Panel A: Europe
Country Imposing Independent Variable England United France Germany
Capital Controls States
Austria Capital control indicator -0.021 -0.066 -0.069 -0.044
(-0.30) (-0.86) (-0.89) (-0.67)
Base country discount rate 0.504* 0.015 0.053 0.553***
(2.49) (0.14) (1.92) (3.56)
Czechoslovakia Capital control indicator -0.045 -0.063 -0.063 -0.062
(-1.36) (-1.58) (-1.58) (-1.51)
Base country discount rate 0.190 0.057 0.022 -0.007
(1.38) (1.08) (1.31) (-0.07)
Estonia Capital control indicator -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(-0.05) (-0.00) (-0.02) (-0.04)
Base country discount rate -0.004 0.034 -0.016 -0.006
(-0.06) (0.94) (-0.83) (-0.14)
Germany Capital control indicator -0.011 -0.008 -0.006
(-0.14) (-0.10) (-0.07)
Base country discount rate 0.353 0.090 -0.008
(1.00) (1.34) (-0.50)
Greece Capital control indicator -0.038 -0.048 -0.051 -0.077
(-0.50) (-0.68) (-0.72) (-1.29)
Base country discount rate 0.268 -0.092 0.019 -0.281
(1.05) (-0.71) (0.67) (-1.52)
Hungary Capital control indicator 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.029
(0.35) (0.37) (0.37) (0.49)
Base country discount rate 0.207 0.011 0.007 0.445***
(0.83) (0.12) (0.69) (4.55)
Italy Capital control indicator 0.064 0.069 0.069 0.072
(1.10) (1.16) (1.18) (1.25)
Base country discount rate 0.312* 0.054 -0.014 -0.052
(2.34) (1.49) (-0.94) (-0.53)
Latvia Capital control indicator 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010
(0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.48)
Base country discount rate -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.028
(-0.12) (-0.44) (-0.73) (0.91)
Romania Capital control indicator -0.056 -0.054 -0.056 -0.058
(-1.02) (-0.99) (-1.03) (-1.06)
Base country discount rate 0.098 0.090 0.001 0.040
(1.20) (1.42) (0.08) (1.15)
Number of Observations 143 143 143 143  
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Table 5:  Explaining the Movement of Discount Rates for Capital Control Countries, 1925-
1936 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Latin America and Asia
Country Imposing Independent Variable England United France Germany
Capital Controls States
Argentina Capital control indicator -0.057 -0.052 -0.046 -0.054
(-1.51) (-1.44) (-1.56) (-1.46)
Base country discount rate -0.041 -0.094 -0.120 -0.006
(-1.64) (-1.18) (-1.22) (-1.03)
Chile Capital control indicator -0.072 -0.068 -0.075 -0.074
(-1.48) (-1.43) (-1.48) (-1.48)
Base country discount rate -0.134 -0.214 -0.016 0.062
(-1.16) (-1.78) (-0.78) (1.07)
Colombia Capital control indicator -0.048 -0.044 -0.047 -0.045
(-1.14) (-1.09) (-1.15) (-1.08)
Base country discount rate -0.035 -0.151 0.009 0.023
(-0.68) (-1.17) (0.87) (0.62)
Japan Capital control indicator -0.020 -0.017 -0.021 -0.020
(-0.64) (-0.55) (-0.65) (-0.64)
Base country discount rate 0.080 0.133 0.004 -0.005
(1.38) (1.58) (0.43) (-0.20)
Number of Observations 143 143 143 143
Notes: Discount rates and base rates are first differenced. Standard errors are shown in  
parentheses and are Newey-West corrected. Statistical signficance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels  are shown with *, **, ***.
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Figure 1:  Average Cover Ratios for Exchange Control Countries 
 
Note: The cover ratio is calculated as the ratio of bank gold reserves and foreign assets to domestic 
liabilities.  Source: Statistisches Handbuch der Weltwirtschaft (1934, 1936/7). 
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Figure 2:  Exchange Rates and Industrial Production, 1929-36  
(1929=100) 
 
Figure 3:  Exchange Rates and Wholesale Prices, 1929-36 
(1929=100)  
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Figure 4: Exchange Rates and Exports, 1929-36 
(1929=100) 
 
Figure 5: Industrial Production and Exchange Rates by Group, 1929-36 
(1929=100) 
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Figure 6: Wholesale Prices and Exchange Rates by Group, 1929-36 
 (1929=100) 
 
Figure 7: Exports and Exchange Rates by Group, 1929-36 
 (1929=100) 
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Figure 8: Average Growth in Industrial Production by Regime and Group 
 
 
Figure 9: Average Inflation Rates by Regime and Group 
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Figure 10: Average Export Growth Rates by Regime and Group  
 
 
Figure 11: Average Money Growth Rates by Regime and Group 
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